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THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON CSR DISCLOSURE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE IN A VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENT
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This study investigates the impact of corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(CSRD) on firm performance and the moderating role of corporate governance on the CSRD-
firm performance relationship of listed companies in Nigeria. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses a panel dataset comprised of 841 firm-year 
observations for the period covering 2007-2016.  Fixed effect regression analysis was used to 
examine the relationship between CSRD and firm performance, and the moderating role of 
corporate governance in the CSRD-firm performance relationship. 
Findings: The results of the study show that there are positive performance implications for 
firms that engage in CSRD. Although we find no effect of board size on the CSRD-firm 
performance relationship, we provide strong evidence of a positive effect of board 
independence on the CSR-firm performance relationship.
Theoretical and Practical Implications: The study contributes to the understanding of 
CSRD-firm performance relationship by providing evidence of the moderating role of 
corporate governance. It is, therefore, recommended that a stronger regulation be put in place 
for CSR engagement and the disclosure of same in Nigeria as well as robust measures for the 
enforcement of corporate governance mechanisms as there are economic benefits to be derived. 
 
Originality/value: The findings contribute to the literature by providing up-to-date and 
original insights on the CSRD-firm performance link within a developing country context. It 
also employs an uncommon method of measuring CSRD, taking into account the institutional 
biases that may arise from other methods employed in studies on developed countries.
Keywords Corporate governance, CSR disclosure, board size, board independence, firm 
performance, Nigeria. 
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Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) continues to be an issue of interest to a diverse range of 
stakeholder groupings. This is largely because it is the primary means of ascertaining the extent 
of an organisation’s contribution to the welfare of its environment. Consequently, interest in 
CSR has grown in the literature as firms continue to consider means of simultaneously pursuing 
economic profits and contributing to societal well-being (Oh, Hong, and Hwang, 2017). One 
way of being accountable to society and stakeholders is for organisations to engage in CSR 
practices and disclose the outcome of those practices. Corporate social responsibility disclosure 
(CSRD) entails communicating CSR outcomes which helps to legitimise organisations’ 
activities. 
An organisation’s profitability, as well as its existence, could be affected by its form and extent 
of CSRD which can be driven by the governance structure in place. Corporate governance is 
premised on the need to reduce the dichotomy and asymmetry that exist between the principal 
(shareholders) and agents (management) in an organisational setting. Due to the principal-agent 
conflict posed by the separation of ownership from control, agency theory was introduced by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a lens through which corporate governance can be viewed. This 
theory suggests that agents, as individuals, can be self-interested and opportunistic (Aguilera, 
2005) and less likely to protect the principals as owners in terms of their interests, but rather 
pursue their personal gains, including risk avoidance, financial manipulation for compensation, 
optimization and embezzlement of corporate resources (Dey, 2008).
CSR can be utilised as a tool by managers to foster their personal interests which might negate 
those of the shareholders. The strength of the corporate governance mechanisms in place would 
serve to either forestall or encourage the achievement of managers’ individualistic interests in 
the utilisation of CSR decisions. This, therefore, portrays that the financial outcome 
(profitability) of CSR activities and their attendant disclosures could be affected by the nature 
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and effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms that exist in the organisation. 
Therefore, in aiding a concise understanding of the relationship that exists between CSRD and 
financial performance, it becomes expedient to analyse the moderating effect of corporate 
governance on the aforementioned relationship.   
In Nigeria, CSRD in annual reports is not a mandatory process, hence acting in a socially 
responsible manner is not necessarily guaranteed. Despite this voluntary regime, it has been 
observed that some listed companies in Nigeria have decided to engage in CSR activities and 
disclose this in their annual report. It is therefore imperative to examine the effect, if any, of 
CSRD on the performance of companies in Nigeria. In addition to the voluntary system, 
Nigeria, like most developing countries, is plagued with weak institutions, poor governance 
practices, weak enforcement agencies and corrupt practices (Adegbite, 2015, Amaeshi et al., 
2016; Chijoke-Mgbame and Mgbame, 2018). These shortcomings in the system no doubt 
provide an enabling environment for firms not to engage in CSR activities and also not to 
disclose the same in any format. Nonetheless, some companies have decided not to capitalize 
on the loopholes in the system, but have gone ahead to engage and disclose their CSR activities, 
given that there may be financial consequences. This, therefore, provides the motivation for 
the current study.  The first objective is to examine the economic impact of CSRD on the 
performance of companies in Nigeria. The second objective is to empirically provide evidence 
of the role of corporate governance on the CSRD-performance relationship. We examine 
corporate governance, as the decision to engage in CSR-related activities lies with the 
management, of which the board is a part. To the best of our knowledge, no study in Nigeria 
has examined the combined effect of corporate governance and CSRD on firm performance.
We add to the current research on CSR in the following ways. Firstly, we provide empirical 
evidence on the effect of CSRD on firm performance in a developing country context, with a 
focus on Nigeria where there are relatively few studies. Given that Nigeria is one of the largest 
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countries in Africa, the findings of this research serve as a building block for further scholarship 
in the region. Secondly, we go beyond other CSR-performance studies, to provide evidence on 
the moderating role of corporate governance on the relationship between CSRD and firm 
performance. Specifically, we examine the size and independence of the board, as Bebchuk 
and Fried (2004) note that they are direct outcomes of a firm’s governance process. Thirdly, 
we employ a different approach in the way we measure CSRD. Specifically, we examine the 
annual report using content analysis to see if there is a dedicated section for CSR. Companies 
in Nigeria are not under any obligation to report on their CSR activities in the annual report. 
For companies to dedicate a section of the annual report to CSR, it, shows that such activities 
are of great importance to the reporting entity.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical background. 
Section 3 provides a review of the literature and develops the hypotheses. The penultimate 
section discusses the research methods, data analyses and results, while the last section 
concludes the study.
Theoretical Background
Corporate Social Responsibility
In the past, businesses have traditionally been seen as economic actors (profit driven) and 
government as political actors encumbered with the responsibility of societal development 
(Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004).  Early attempts on the study of CSR have defined the concept 
as obligations of businesses to “pursue those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow 
those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society” 
(Bowen, 1953, p6). However, the dramatic increase in globalization and international trade 
across the world has seen new demands for improved transparency and corporate citizenship 
that aligns the process and outcomes of businesses to the needs and expectations of society. 
This has led to a range of concepts that can be linked to CSR, including corporate social 
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performance (Wartick and Cochran 1985) and corporate social responsiveness (Sethi, 1979). 
These notions create a level of varying definitions with various perspectives1 that seek to align 
the economic and social orientation of businesses as important actors in firm performance. That 
notwithstanding, CSR has been described as “an ill and incompletely defined concept” (Baron, 
2010, p9), making it prone to a number of conflicting interpretations (Amaeshi and Adi, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the definitions of CSR (McWilliams et al., 2006), a 
common trend in the various definitions is the notion of responsible and sustainable corporate 
behaviour that facilitates a firm’s long-term interest. 
In a bid to understand the rationale and strategies for CSR engagement, a number of theories 
have emerged. For instance, the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) postulates that the 
objectives of a firm should go beyond maximizing the wealth of shareholders and incorporate 
the needs of its numerous stakeholders, such as employees, customers, community and 
suppliers. This argument is also premised on the broader conception of corporate governance, 
which suggests, “companies and societies are interdependent” (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, p31). 
Another important theoretical explanation of CSR is legitimacy theory (Gray et al., 1995; 
Deegan, 2002) which stems from the notion of a social contract that exists between the business 
organisation and the society in which it operates. To survive and progress in society, business 
organisations must, therefore, fulfil their part of the contract by taking into consideration the 
values and norms of society. Organisations therefore engage in CSR activities in order to 
legitimise their behaviours and actions. One way for firms to legitimise their actions is through 
the disclosure of their CSR activities in their annual reports. The resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) has also been used to explain the notion of CSR. This theory 
argues that it is the amount of resources available to the organisation that determines the extent 
of its CSR activities. These resources could be tangible or intangible, financial and non-
1 See Idowu and Papasolomou (2007) for various definitions of CSR
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financial, internal or external. Institutional theory (Campbell, 2007), on the other hand, argues 
that the institutional environment of the organisations determines their CSR. These could be 
the regulations provided by private and public bodies, the existence of non-governmental 
agencies and the monitoring role they perform, the institutionalised norms of society and the 
behaviour of other organisations within the industry or sector.
Corporate Governance
The concept of corporate governance is based on the underlying principle of separation of 
ownership and management, as first identified by Berle and Means (1932).  In order to 
minimize the potential conflict of interest that may arise as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) proposes corporate 
governance as a means to address the principal-agent conflict. Proponents of corporate 
governance mainly fall into two categories – those who consider corporate governance as a 
tool to protect shareholder/owner interests (the narrow perspective), and those who consider it 
within the wider spectrum of protecting stakeholder interests (the broader perspective). While 
proponents of the broader perspective of corporate governance may have been policymakers 
or advocates, proponents of the narrow perspective are advocates of agency theory in favor of 
shareholders wealth maximization. There are however, limits to which the agency theory can 
be applied (Kolk and Pinske, 2010). That notwithstanding, the broader perspective of corporate 
governance has evolved to include the relationship between companies and a wider range of 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, communities and 
customers, as being equally significant investors (Jamali et al., 2008; Monks and Minow, 
2004). These stakeholders provide the resources that contribute to the firm’s survival, success 
and competitiveness. The narrow perspective, on the other hand, considers the return on 
investment to suppliers of finance as the major focus of the firm with very minimal 
consideration of social and environmental activities (Saravanamuthu, 2004).
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Regardless of the narrow (shareholder) or broader (stakeholder) perspective, the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance (financial and non-financial) cannot be over-
emphasized. The board of directors and the role boards play as major actors in corporate 
governance have attracted considerable attention in recent times (Darko et al., 2016). This has 
also led to the emergence of various theories of corporate governance to strengthen debates on 
the link between the board of directors and firm performance. The agency theory situates the 
role of the board as a custodian charged with the day-to-day management of the company on 
behalf of shareholders. One key mechanism relevant to this theory is board independence as a 
monitoring tool to control management actions (Tricker, 1994). Over time, the agency theory 
has led to a number of controversies, leading to the development of new theories; for instance, 
stewardship theory, which is based on the premise that managers are predominantly trustworthy 
and essentially reliable custodians of resources given to them, in which monitoring and 
independence are irrelevant (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The resource dependence theory, as 
noted by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), considers that firms are dependent on external 
constituents as a means of procuring and transacting with necessary resources in order to 
survive. The board of directors is therefore viewed as the unit through which crucial resources 
such as legitimacy and counsel are linked to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Finally, 
stakeholder theory goes a step further in emphasizing the role of boards beyond shareholder 
protection and management monitoring to include wider social responsibilities of stakeholder 
accountability, corporate citizenship and societal stewardship in forms such as reporting and 
disclosure (Keasey and Wright, 1997).  As noted by Kiel and Nicholson (2003, p31) “the board 
of directors should be able to judge whether the interests of all stakeholders are being justly 
balanced”. The various theories discussed above suggest a relationship between the board of 
directors, as active participants in corporate governance with the potential to influence CSRD 
and overall firm performance.
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Literature review and hypotheses development
The above theoretical exposition has laid the foundation for numerous studies on the effect of 
the two concepts (corporate governance and CSRD) on firm outcomes, such as firm risk (Jo 
and Na, 2012), earnings management (Kim et al., 2012), reputation (Lev et al., 2010), 
profitability (Mishra and Suar, 2010), amongst others. The majority of these studies, however, 
focus on either of the two concepts with few examining the joint effect of corporate governance 
and CSRD on firm performance. In addition, most of the prior studies focus on developed 
economies with a strong institutional framework and effective governance systems. For 
example, in the UK, Qiu et al., (2016) find that there is increased market value for firms with 
higher social disclosures. When compared with environmental disclosure, they conclude that 
social disclosure is more important to stakeholders of the firm. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) 
find a positive relationship between CSR and firm performance for a sample of US firms. 
Moreover, the relationship is mediated by consumer awareness. Specifically, they find that for 
firms with low customer awareness, there is a negative or insignificant relationship between 
CSR and performance. From a transitional economy perspective, Wang et al. (2015) show that, 
using a quantile regression analysis for a sample of Taiwanese firms, the positive relationship 
between CSR and firm performance is driven by brand equity. Further analysis reveals that this 
positive relationship is driven by brand equity. In contrast, they find that brand loyalty 
negatively impacts on the relationship between CSR and firm performance. Relatedly, Mishra 
and Suar (2010) find that for Indian firms, there is a positive relationship between CSR and 
firm performance across different dimensions of CSR activities. 
A review of prior empirical studies reveals contradicting viewpoints on the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance, with divergent results. For 
instance, Cheng (2008) provides evidence of a negative relationship between board size and 
the performance volatility of firms in the US. They argue that as board size increases, firms are 
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less likely to take extreme decisions which, in turn, leads to lower variation in corporate 
performance. Similarly, Ujunwa (2012), Guest (2009) and Lasfer (2004) find a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance measured by return on asset employed, 
Tobin’s q and stock returns for UK companies. From the banking industry, Liang et al., (2013) 
find that board size reveals a negative association with firm performance in China. Using board 
size as a control variable, Bennouri et al., (2018) find that there is a negative effect of board 
size on Tobin’s q. On the contrary, some studies provide evidence that board size positively 
affects firm performance (see Belkhir, 2009; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Guest, 2009), while 
others find no effect of board size on firm performance (Assenga et al., 2018; Duru et al., 2016).
The independence of the board is another governance mechanism that is strongly debated in 
the literature. The argument shows that independent directors serve as better monitors of the 
firm on behalf of shareholders (Adams et al., 2010). Independent directors have also been found 
to be a source of additional resources for the firm (Duppati et al., 2019). While some studies 
show there is a positive relationship between board independence and firm performance, others 
provide a negative or insignificant relationship. For instance, O’Connell and Cramer (2010) 
find a strong positive association between board independence and firm performance for Irish 
firms. Joh and Jung (2012) find that board independence positively affects firm value in a 
sample of Korean firms; however, they document that this positive relationship exists when 
there are low information transaction costs. Duppati et al. (2019) conclude that there is a 
positive relationship between board independence and firm performance in Spanish firms. 
Similarly, Liu et al., (2015) show that there is a positive relationship between board 
independence and firm operating performance for Chinese firms. The positive effect is stronger 
for government-controlled firms. Similar positive findings have been documented in early 
studies for the UK (Ezammel and Watson, 1993) and the US (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). In 
contrast, Erkens et al., (2012) document a negative effect of independent directors on firm 
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performance for Bank Holding Companies in a cross-country analysis, whereas, Adams and 
Mehran (2012) find no relationship between board independence and firm performance. From 
the family business perspective, García-Ramos and García-Olalla (2011) reveal a negative 
effect of board independence on performance when the descendants of the founder are in charge 
of running the firm, but for the founder-controlled firm, they find a positive effect of board 
independence on performance. 
In light of the foregoing, there are obvious conflicting results on the relationship between CSR 
and firm performance on the one hand, and corporate governance and firm performance on the 
other. The decision to engage in CSR activities is one strategic decision made by the board. 
Our argument is that given the weak governance system in Nigeria, firm-specific corporate 
governance practices may play a moderating role in the CSR-firm performance relationship. 
We, therefore, propose the following hypotheses;
H1: There is a positive relationship between CSR and firm performance
H2: Board size positively affects the relationship between CSR and firm performance
H3: Board independence positively affects the relationship between CSR and firm performance
Data, methodology and model specification
The population of the study consists of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, with 
the exclusion of financial firms due to a more regulatory requirement for financial firms. We 
also deleted firms without relevant information for analysing the hypothesized relationships. 
The final sample is an unbalanced panel data which is made up of 83 companies with 841 firm-
year observations for the period covering 2007-2016.
The dependent variable for our study is return on asset (ROA) this is measured as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets. The 
advantage of using EBITDA rather than net income is that it allows for comparison across 
forms. Following Chijoke-Mgbame and Mgbame (2018), the independent variable CSRD is 
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measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is a section in the published annual 
report dedicated to CSR activities and 0 otherwise. Given the voluntary disclosure system in 
Nigeria, companies that decide to dedicate a section in their annual report to discuss and present 
their CSR activities demonstrate the importance of such activities to the company. To obtain 
this information, the annual reports for each company were downloaded from the respective 
companies’ websites in order to determine if there is a section dedicated to the disclosure of 
CSR activities of the company or not.
Next, we collected data for our two measures of corporate governance which are used as the 
interaction variables; board size and board independence. Board size is measured as the number 
of directors on the board; board independence is measured as the percentage of independent 
directors on the board. We collected the data from both Bloomberg and the annual reports. For 
those without information on Bloomberg, we hand collected the information from the annual 
report; the same applies to the control variables. To minimize the effects of outliers, all 
variables except the dummy variables were winsorized. We specify the model in line with the 
hypotheses:
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽4
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜇…(1)
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽4
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜇…(2)
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽4
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜇…(3)
------Insert Table 1 here-----
Presentation and analysis of data
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. We observe that the mean for the 
CSRD is 0.44 which indicates that 44% (less than half) of the sampled firms have a dedicated 
section for CSRD. The standard deviation of 0.5 indicates the degree to which CSRD for the 
sample exhibits significant clustering around the mean. ROA, the performance measure, has a 
mean of 2.74 with a standard deviation of 17.05. The average board size in the sample is 8.91, 
with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 19. The level of board independence in the sample is 
between 16.67 and 88.89 with an average of 62.38. This shows that more than half of the 
sampled firms have an independent board. The mean age of the sampled firms is 24.58 with a 
minimum of one year and a maximum of 56 years. The statistics on leverage reveal a mean of 
76.77, with an approximate standard deviation of 140. This suggests that there is a huge 
variation in the level of debt amongst the sampled firm. This supports the use of EBITDA as a 
more appropriate measure of firm performance. Table 2 also shows the results of the test for 
multicollinearity in the last column (VIF). The presence of multicollinearity could lead to 
unreliable coefficient estimates. We conduct the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) test to check 
for this problem. Landau and Everitt (2004) suggest that a VIF value of 10 and above is a cause 
for concern. The results reveal that there is no multicollinearity problem as all VIF values are 
below 102.   
------Insert Table 2 here-----
------Insert Table 3 here-----
The nature of the data used for this study suggests that there may a problem of causality 
between the dependent and independent variables. Also, there may be some time-invariant 
2 We also check for high correlations among the variables. But the correlation results reveal that there is no 
cause for concern. We do not report the results due to word count limits. 
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firm-specific characteristics in the data. Therefore, the use of ordinary least squares will not be 
appropriate for this study. To proceed, we conduct the Hausman test to decide between the use 
of a fixed effect or a random effect model; the Hausman test supports the use of a fixed effect 
estimation.    
Table 3 presents the results of four regression analyses3 using the fixed effect model. Model 1 
shows the effect of CSR disclosure on firm performance. We find that there is a statistically 
positive relationship (β=0.236, p≤5%) between CSRD and firm performance. This provides 
support for hypothesis 1, that, for Nigerian companies, engaging in CSR disclosure positively 
affects firm performance. One possible reason for the positive result is that firms which engage 
in CSR-related activities are likely to have a good reputation and also attract the attention of 
consumers in society which can positively affect firms’ financial performance. The results are 
in tandem with prior studies, such as Saeidi et al. (2015), which find that CSR positively affects 
firm performance through reputation and customer satisfaction amongst Iranian firms. 
Similarly, Madueño et al., (2016) show that there is a positive relationship between CSR and 
firm performance for Spanish SMEs (see also, Qiu et al., 2016; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).  
Next, in Model 2 of Table 3, we include an interaction variable to capture the mediating role 
of corporate governance (board size) on the relationship between CSRD and firm performance. 
The coefficient of the interaction variable, although positive, is not statistically significant. 
Thus, we fail to accept hypothesis 2. The results suggest that the size of the board does not 
affect the relationship between CSRD and firm performance. Prior studies (Assenga et al., 
2018; Duru et al., 2016) find no evidence of a relationship between board size and firm 
performance. In Model 3 of Table 3, we include an interaction variable CSRD*BInd. This is 
to capture the moderating effect of independent boards on the relationship between CSRD and 
firm performance. We find that there is a statistically positive relationship between the 
3 For brevity we have included all regressions in one table.
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interaction term (CSRD*BInd; β=0.014, p≤5%) and firm performance. This result suggests that 
having independent directors on the board enhances the CSRD, which increases the financial 
performance of the company. Thus, providing support for hypothesis 3. The results also support 
advocacy for more independent boards as independent directors serve as useful resources for 
the firm, especially for countries with weak institutions and poor governance. Furthermore, 
prior studies find that there is a positive relationship between board independence and CSR. 
For example, Lone et al., (2016) provide evidence of a positive relationship between board 
independence and CSR disclosure for selected firms in Pakistan. Also, Ducassy and 
Montandrau (2015) find a positive association between CSR and firm performance in France, 
while Malik and Makhdoom (2016) and Liu et al., (2015) provide a positive association 
between board independence and firm performance.
In addition to the main variables, we have included a number of control variables. In model 1, 
we include both corporate governance variables. However, we include one of the governance 
variables at a time in models 2 and 3 respectively to avoid capturing the effect of the other 
governance variables in the interaction models. In model 1, we find a statistically positive 
relationship between board size and firm performance. This is in support of prior studies, which 
find that large boards are advantageous to firms. Large boards tend to bring various ideas and 
opinions, which could improve the quality of decision-making. However, a few studies (see, 
Bennouri et al., 2018; Guest, 2009) have found a negative effect of large boards on firm 
performance, citing long decision-making processes and the potential for ‘group think’ which 
can result in poor firm performance. In model 1, we also include board independence as a 
control variable. We find a statistically positive effect of board independence on firm 
performance; this suggests that more independent boards increase firm performance. The 
results are consistent with Liu et al., (2015) who find a positive effect of board independence 
on firm performance. To control for firm specific factors, we include a host of control variables 
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in all models. We do not find a significant relationship between firm size and ownership 
structure in all models. We find a marginally significant positive effect of firm age on 
performance in Model 2. In all models, we find a statistically significant relationship between 
firm cash and big4auditors on firm performance, thus suggesting that cash availability increases 
firm performance and that the use of one of the big 4 audit companies positively affects firm 
performance. For leverage, we find a statistically negative relationship with firm performance. 
This result suggests that debt reduces firm performance, as observed in Singh and Faircloth 
(2005) and Assenga et al., (2018). Lastly, ownership structure, although negative, exhibits no 
statistical effect on firm performance, (see, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). As a robustness 
check, we include both interaction variables and control variables in Model 4; we find that the 
results remain the same.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to contribute to the broader literature of CSRD by examining the nexus 
between CSRD and firm performance. Drawing on the legitimacy and stakeholder theories, we 
extend this line of inquiry by moderating the corporate governance factor on the perceived 
relationship within a voluntary environment. Whilst most studies focus on the direct 
relationship between CSRD and firm performance, we ventured to provide evidence as to how 
corporate governance could influence the aforementioned relationship. Consequently, the 
study adopted a novel approach by confirming the perceived relationship and showing how 
specific corporate governance mechanisms affect the relationship.
Although companies have been credited with engaging in CSR, they have also been criticized 
for either no, or inadequate, disclosures of their activities. Despite the fact that some countries 
are promoting mandatory disclosure, while others operate a voluntary regime, CSRD has 
increased universally in both complexity and dimension over the past two decades. In most 
developing countries such as Nigeria, CSRD still relies on the voluntary initiatives of the 
Page 15 of 24 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
16
reporting entity. Undoubtedly, in the absence of any mandatory requirement, with the weakness 
of institutions and paucity of laws, companies operating in this kind of environment are likely 
to take advantage of the poor governance system to de-emphasize disclosure. It is against this 
backdrop that we consider the imperativeness of examining the financial performance 
consequences of firms that have decided to look beyond the weaknesses in the system to do 
what is right. 
The results of the study show that there are positive performance implications for firms that 
engage in CSRD. Notwithstanding the poor governance system, some firms in Nigeria still 
adhere to the statutory governance mechanisms of appropriate board size and board 
independence. Since the board is involved in steering the strategic direction of the firm, we 
investigate the effect of these two governance tools on the relationship between CSRD and 
firm performance. Although we find a direct effect of board size on firm performance, we do 
not find any significant moderating effect of board size on the CSRD-firm performance 
relationship. However, we provide strong evidence of a positive effect of board independence 
on the CSRD-firm performance relationship. 
This study, therefore, recommends stronger legislation and regulation for CSR engagement and 
disclosure amongst Nigerian companies as there are economic benefits to be derived whilst 
addressing the needs and improving the lot of society. In addition, the corporate governance 
systems in Nigeria should be rebranded and made stronger with the formulation of relevant 
policies that can promote implementation and enforcement. This is important as this study has 
shown that the governance system can improve the associated effect of CSR on firm 
performance. For instance, this study provides evidence to support the fact that the promotion 
of independent boards can improve firm performance. 
We acknowledge there are some limitations of our study but these provide interesting avenues 
for future studies. Although our study spans a number of years and firms, some governance 
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mechanisms were not tested due to unavailability of data. In addition, we only consider listed 
firms; therefore, an examination of private firms may add to the findings. The unavailability of 
authentic data also prevented the inclusion of such firms. Nevertheless, the aforementioned 
limitations do not affect the validity of the results obtained.
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Tables
Table 1 Variable Definition
Variable Acronym Definition
Return on Asset ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets
Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure
CSRD This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if there is a 
section in the published annual report dedicated to CSR 
activities and 0 otherwise
Board Size BSize The number of directors on the board
Board Independence BInd The percentage of independent directors on the board
Firm Size FSize The log of total assets
Firm Age FAge The number of years a company has been listed on the 
exchange
Firm Cash FCash The total of cash and cash equivalents scaled by total 
assets
Leverage Lev The ratio of total debts to total assets
Ownership Own This is a dummy variable indicating 1 if more than 20% 
of the firm is owned by institutional investors and 0 
otherwise
Big4auditor B4Aud This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the big four auditors and 0 otherwise.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF
ROA 816 13.290 37.841 -149.687 172.053
CSRD 810 0.44 0.50 0 1 1.13
Bsize 803 8.91 2.44 4 19 1.37
BInd 726 62.38 14.25 16.67 88.89 1.06
FSize 809 6.94 0.77 4.84 9 1.59
FAge 818 24.58 12.65 1 56 1.08
FCash 808 9.44 11.42 -6.06 96.73 1.06
Lev 808 76.77 140.44 4.71 1797.72 1.06
Own 811 0.19 0.39 0 1 1.06
B4Aud 818 0.60 0.49 0 1 1.28
Table 3 Fixed effect regression of CSR-firm performance and CSR* Corporate 
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Governance and firm performance
Dependent variable= ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Without 
Interaction
With Board 
Size 
Interaction
With Board 
Independence 
Interaction
With both 
Interaction 
Variables
CSR 0.236** 0.607* 0.319*** 0.246**
(0.098) (0.326) (0.095) (0.119)
CSR*BSize 0.037 0.034
(0.035) (0.329)
CSR*BInd 0.014** 0.019*
(0.006) (0.010)
BSize 0.507** 0.054* 0.056**
(0.201) (0.028) (0.028)
BInd 0.309* 0.254** 0.365**
(0.176) (0.103) (0.186)
Firm Size -0.092 -0.087 -0.033 -0.024
(0.084) (0.074) (0.067) (0.077)
Firm Age 0.005 0.006* 0.006 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Firm Cash 0.023*** 0.164*** 0.181*** 0.011**
(0.004) (0.031) (0.031) (0.005)
Leverage -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Ownership -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Big4Auditors 0.340*** 0.248** 0.198* 0.291**
(0.113) (0.100) (0.101) (0.123)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 725 725 725 725
R2 0.140 0.186 0.201 0.174
Notes: This table shows the results of the fixed effect regressions. Model 1shows the regression without the 
governance variable interaction. Model 2 shows the interaction effect with board size. Model 3 shows the 
interaction effect with board independence. Model 4 includes both interaction variables.  Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. *, **, ***, represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All variables are as 
defined in Table1.
Page 24 of 24Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
